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What happened in China?
Since April 2012, China witnessed a series of violent public protests 
against the Japanese decision to purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands, followed by a diplomatic row between Beijing and Tokyo (and, 
occasionally, Taipei). Anti-Japanese rallies were reported in eleven 
Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Qingdao, 
Harbin, Chengdu and Shenzhen. The demonstrators smashed Ja-
panese-made cars, destroyed Japanese restaurants, stores and fac-
tories, burned Japanese flags and chanted anti-Japanese slogans. 
These events caused serious damage for investors and companies 
from both countries. Reacting to those demonstrations, Panasonic 
and Canon suspended production in their Chinese factories. Chi-
nese businessmen and tourists had to cancel their trips to Japan, 
while many Japanese left the mainland. The airlines from both coun-
tries cut seats, cancelled flights and postponed the opening of new 
routes. Tensions continued in the following months and escalated 
in September 2012. 
Background to the Chinese public protest
The tensions between China and Japan resulted from a dispute 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Public protests in China erupted 
when the Japanese government unveiled plans to acquire the three 
islands from their private Japanese owner in April (eventually ac-
quiring them in September 2012). Activists from China and Japan 
From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the 
Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
Besides providing further evidence of growing 
Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for 
other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing 
leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the 
only source of foreign policy decisions in China, 
faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic 
opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign 
policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy 
decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from 
larger social developments. Even if foreign policy 
decisions in China are still made without direct input 
from civil society, the influence of social forces on 
Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. 
The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach 
to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights 
are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by 
the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double 
its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.
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setting sail towards the islands contributed to the escalation of 
the conflict. The Chinese government sent patrol ships into the 
theatre to reaffirm Chinese claims to sovereignty over the islands. 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located between the northeast 
coast of Taiwan, at the eastern coast of China and southwest of 
Japanese Okinawa, covering an area of just seven square kilome-
tres. Three of them are just barren rocks, and five can be des-
cribed as islets rather than islands. None of them are inhabited. 
Currently, they are under Japanese control. However, China and 
Taiwan claim that the territories have been part of China/Taiwan 
since ancient times, while questioning the legitimacy of Japanese 
ownership. The first reason for the political salience of this issue 
is the islands’ proximity to the strategically important shipping 
lanes, which makes them significant for delimitations of mari-
time boundaries. Second, besides abundant fish stocks, it is sus-
pected that there are rich oil and gas reserves in the vicinity and 
the surrounding seabed. Last but not least, besides the strategic 
and economic importance, the islands have a strong symbolic 
value as disputes over their sovereignty evoke very strong nati-
onal feelings in China, Japan and Taiwan. Rows over the islands 
already erupted during the 1970s and 1980s. As in the case of 
those earlier clashes, also in 2012, Beijing again suppressed de-
monstrations. Although originally, the Chinese leadership tacitly 
tolerated popular protests, by the end of October 2012, it opted 
for suppressing the demonstrations, not wanting to put at risk 
economic and political relations with Japan. 
What has changed in Chinese foreign policy?
At first sight, it looks like the political dynamics of Chinese fo-
reign policy making has not changed - the decisions are taken 
by a highly centralised Chinese government without public con-
strains. However, a closer look at the protests in China and the 
government’s reaction reveals two general tendencies. First, na-
tionalism in China has been on the rise in recent years. Impres-
sive Chinese economic development gave a boost to national 
self-esteem, and popular sentiments against the historical Wes-
tern and Japanese domination of China have been increasing. 
Nationalist sentiments in the population fill the void left by the 
declining ideological power of Chinese communism and bolster 
the legitimacy of the ruling elites. Second, traces of a Chinese 
civil society have been developing in recent years, which the Chi-
nese leadership is unable to ignore. Thus, Chinese foreign policy 
has to take into account domestic opinion more and more, even 
when those run counter to the official line. 
While the influence of civil society on public policy is not compa-
rable to Western societies, the Chinese leadership is increasingly 
forced to take public opinion into account. Chinese foreign po-
licy is undergoing pluralisation, with the number of governmen-
tal and semi-governmental actors involved in policy-formulation 
expanding. Chinese leadership is progressively engaging in a 
dialogue with a host of experts and think tanks. Also, Chinese 
society is becoming better educated and is enjoying more and 
more access to new sources of information over the internet. 
The Chinese are able to overcome government’s barriers to free-
dom of speech. Chinese people increasingly voice their political 
demands, thus fundamentally changing the relations between 
state and society. While the state still exercises control over ac-
cess to information, it has to accommodate current social and 
technological changes. Wu Hailong, China’s ambassador to the 
EU, recently explained to European Voice that, in order to meet 
public demands, a ‘majority of government offices have put up 
official websites, launched online forums and set up spokesper-
son positions. More than 50,000 government workers have ope-
ned microblogs under official auspices’. 
Chinese public opinion has, until now, been mobilised mainly 
in a nationalistic context, something which Chinese leadership 
is presently willing to tolerate. Still, public sentiment is relevant 
not only when it motivates people to take certain actions against 
the government, but also when it performs in an indirect way by 
redefining Chinese “national interest”. Not the demonstrations 
or protest directed against the government, but the growing pu-
blic participation in creation of the discourse on national interest 
will transform the parameters under which China’s foreign policy 
making takes place, leading to gradual de-centralisation of fo-
reign policy making. 
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What are the implications for EU – China relations? 
Chinese nationalism is mainly directed against Japan and the 
USA. Chinese public opinion recalls Japanese aggression from the 
1930s up until the end of WW2, while the USA is considered as 
an economic rival as well as a strategic threat, which may amplify 
after the President Obama’s recent ‘pivot’ to Asia. At the same 
time, Chinese perception of Europe is more favourable. According 
to opinion polls in China (J. Delhey and T. Graf: 2011), the EU 
is largely considered a ‘partner’ or even ‘friend’. Those opinion 
polls reveal ‘strong sympathy in China for Europe’, and convey an 
‘overwhelmingly favourable image’ of Europe among the Chinese 
public. Thus, at first glance, it appears that the rise of Chinese 
nationalism should not endanger EU – China relations. But still, 
if we take a closer look at the Chinese perception of the EU, we 
find one major issue to discredit the Europeans in the eyes of the 
Chinese: the promotion of human rights and democracy by the EU. 
According to recent polls, 70% of respondents perceive the promo-
tion of democracy by the EU in the world, and, especially towards 
China, as ‘being motivated by self-serving interests’ (C. Welzel and 
T. Graf, 2011: 7). In other words, even if the Chinese view Euro-
peans as more trustworthy and less aggressive compared to the 
US and Japan, the EU’s agenda on democracy and human rights is 
generally perceived as an aggressive act. 
Given the negative perception of the EU’s promotion of its values 
among the Chinese citizens, the EU should be careful about trying 
to export its own normative framework to China, something that 
might quickly be interpreted as a form of cultural imperialism. As 
nationalism is currently providing a second source of legitimacy 
for the CCP after economic growth, Chinese elites cannot afford 
to be perceived as bowing to Western demands on democracy and 
human rights. Accordingly, Chinese authorities do not feel at ease 
with making concessions on issues such as the present embargo 
on arms sales to China or the EU’s insistence on including a human 
rights clause during the negotiations of the Partnership and Coo-
peration Agreement (PCA) launched in 2007 as they may be per-
ceived as an undue Western influence. Rather than shaming China 
for violations of human rights, the EU should attempt to engage 
China on an equal level. The increasing relevance of civil society 
to Chinese public policy making implies that a crucial element of 
European engagement with China has to be a sustained dialogue 
with civil society. That is, the EU should focus on developing links 
to Chinese civil society, while steering clear of alienating Chinese 
public opinion by being perceived as imposing Western norms. 
The EU-China human rights dialogue, initiated in 1996, was a first 
step in the right direction - the policy of engagement through a 
‘constructive dialogue’. However, these attempts to engage the 
Chinese leadership have produced mixed results. Despite small 
progress in some areas such as socio-economic development, con-
tinuing violations of human rights do occur, owing to a lack of 
progress in civil and political rights.
The EU, in an effort to bring to the table other actors besides high-
ranking officials, introduced two more tracks to the dialogue in 
addition to the diplomatic level, which are expert seminars and 
technical co-operation projects. Still, exchanges between the aca-
demic and NGO communities within those seminars are not free 
from political inference and normative bias. The third tier, the 
technical co-operation projects, seems to be more successful in 
influencing Chinese society. Those projects directly engage with 
the different judicial institutions in China while not being subject 
to an excessive amount of Chinese political scrutiny. Chinese legal 
experts are thus increasingly exposed to the European legal sys-
tem and its norms. Chinese students gain knowledge of European 
law in the China-EU Law School at the China University of Political 
Science and Law in Beijing. These initiatives obviously increase the 
awareness of certain groups of Chinese society of European rules 
and norms.
New channels for the EU’s promotion of human rights and de-
mocracy in China
The EU should focus its efforts on initiatives that are similar to 
technical co-operation projects, and directly introduce European 
values and norms to various groups of Chinese society. The final 
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goal may be creation of the ‘complex interdependence’, which 
according to Keohane and Nye, in addition to the formal contact 
between the governments, involve informal relations between 
the members of the government as well as informal relations 
between different parts of the society and is characterised by a 
lack of hierarchy between the issues on the agenda of partici-
pants. Such an approach might involve an outsourcing of the EU 
– China dialogue on human rights and democracy to think tanks, 
NGOs, institutions of higher education and other civil society in-
stitutions, directly involving Chinese civil society. Even if Nye and 
Keohane considered the possibility of the creation of such chan-
nels between the democratic countries and pluralistic societies, 
while in China one will look in vain for freedom, independent 
voices or pluralism, there is already evidence that domestic pu-
blic pressure cannot be neglected by Beijing leadership. As long 
as the EU is not able to expand its values in China with the car-
rot and stick approach, nor through bargaining with the Chinese 
government, nor through coercion, it has to further explore the 
growing possibilities of changing China from the bottom-up. For 
this reason the EU-China High Level People-to-People Dialogue 
(HPPD) whose first round was held on 18 April 2012 raises great 
hopes. HPPD’s particular strength rests in the fact that it was 
not established under the banner of human rights promotion. 
Yet, with the aim of strengthening mutual exchange in educa-
tion, research, culture and among youth, it will contribute to the 
promotion of these values via the impact on the creation of the 
democratic imaginary within Chinese society.
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